Europe’s tech dependencies are alarming, and that is why I welcome the Commission’s Tech Sovereignty Package and the work led by Executive Vice-President Virkkunen.
The objective is the right one. We need stronger European capabilities in semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, AI and critical technologies. We cannot continue building our digital future on strategic dependencies. However, actions matter.
First, we must clearly define what technological sovereignty means in practice. I think it should mean that Europe retains effective control over its critical technologies, infrastructure, data, and strategic capabilities, without excessive reliance on non-European actors.
Achieving this requires a strong European sovereign technology base. Critical technologies and infrastructure should be predominantly owned, governed, developed and operated within Europe, and remain under European jurisdiction and control.
The Chips Act 2.0 rightly focuses on strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem, but we will not create demand only through political declarations. The real opportunity lies in public procurement and industry alliances. If we want European technologies to scale, we must be smarter about how our money is spent.
The Cloud and AI Development Act is where the sovereignty debate gets real. The proposal would accelerate data centre investments through faster permitting, easier grid connections and streamlined procedures. These measures are needed, but if technological sovereignty is truly the objective, these advantages should be reserved for European-controlled infrastructure and sovereign cloud projects.
Proposed Data Centre Acceleration Zones cannot become a fast lane for non-European hyperscalers. Otherwise, Europe risks accelerating investment without increasing European control, strengthening the market position of non-European hyperscalers under the banner of sovereignty. (!)
The proposal to stress-test tech dependencies is also a welcome step. However, the current approach focuses on identifying dependencies and assessing risks, while leaving follow-up action to Member States. A stronger approach would require not only mapping vulnerabilities, but also putting in place concrete plans, timelines and targets to reduce critical dependencies.
The stronger emphasis on open source is welcome. Reducing vendor lock-in and improving interoperability are important objectives. However, the package remains vague on how the “open source first” principle will be translated into practice. Open source can be an important enabler of technological sovereignty, but it is a tool, not a strategy in itself.
Europe needs a clear and shared understanding of technological sovereignty. Achieving it will take 10-15 years, but the work must start now. Public procurement should help build markets for European solutions, and our policies must be consistent. We cannot call for greater European control over critical infrastructure while simultaneously embracing initiatives such as Pax Silica that risk deepening strategic dependencies.
The topic was discussed in the Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE) on 3 June 2026. Watch the video here.
